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Admissibility of In-court Identifications * Unnecessarily
Suggestive Out-of-court Identifications * Due Process
Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977).P RIOR TO the Supreme Court's decision in Manson v. Brathwaite,1 a
substantial amount of confusion existed concerning the judicial test
which was to be applied to in-court and out-of-court criminal identification
procedures. The Court, in the case of Stovall v. Denno,2 had first set forth
a two stage test for determining whether such procedures were violative
of due process. While later cases were somewhat unclear, the Stovall test
continued to be used. When the Court again confronted the identification
procedure question in the case of Neil v. Biggers,' a new "totality of the
circumstances" test was set forth. However, since the Neil fact situation arose
prior to Stovall, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, when confronted with
the instant case of Manson, assumed that the Stovall test still applied to
fact situations arising after Stovall, and so ruled. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed and held that the Neil test should have been applied, thus
clarifying for the first time since Stovall the Court's view on identification
procedures. While Manson undoubtedly will have a profound effect on the
judicial view of criminal identification procedures, there is some question
as to whether the Court chose the proper test in light of the goals the Court
attempted to meet.
In May, 1970 Jimmy Glover, an undercover Connecticut state police
officer, purchased heroin from a man whose name at that time was un-
known to him. Later the same evening, Glover gave a physical description
of the man to a local police detective who recognized the description given
as that of Nowell Brathwaite. He obtained a photograph of Brathwaite from
police headquarters and dropped it off at Glover's office. Two days after
Glover had made the purchase, he viewed the photograph for the first
time and identified the person shown as the same person from whom he
had purchased the heroin. Brathwaite was arrested in August, 1970, in the
same apartment at which the sale to Glover had taken place.
In January, 1971, during the trial of the case, the photograph from
which Glover had identified Brathwaite was received into evidence without
objection. Glover, who had not seen Brathwaite since the date of the sale,
testified unequivocally that the person shown in the photograph was the
197 S.Ct. 2243 (1977).
2 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
3 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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same person from whom he had made the heroin purchase. Glover, also
without defendant's objection, made a positive in-court identification of
Brathwaite. The jury found Brathwaite guilty of both counts of a criminal
information charging him with illegal possession and sale of narcotics.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Brathwaite contended
for the first time that the trial court erred in permitting Glover to make
the in-court identification before it determined whether Glover's observance
of Brathwaite's photograph two days after the sale was prejudicial.' The
court affirmed the conviction5 and did not consider the merits of Brathwaite's
argument that the court erred in allowing an in-court identification without
first having made a determination of whether or not the out-of-court identi-
fication was prejudicial.' The court based its affirmance on the ground
that Brathwaite had not shown that substantial injustice resulted from
admission of the evidence. Absent such a showing, a claim of error not
made or passed upon by the trial court could not be considered on appeal.'
Upon petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the federal courts, the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut found that it
could rule on the merits of the identification question based on the fact
that Brathwaite had exhausted his state remedies on the question, as required
by the habeas corpus statute." The court, however, ruled that there had
4 97 S.Ct. at 2247 n.7 (1977).
5 State v. Brathwaite, 164 Conn. 617, 325 A.2d 284 (1973).
6 As used herein, an "in-court" identification is an identification made during the trial of the
accused. An "out-of-court" identification is any identification made during the course of the
police investigation.
7 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977), rehearing denied, 98 S.Ct. 241 (1978).
s The U.S. Supreme Court noted that both the district court and the circuit court of appeals
had found that the merits of the case were properly before them, although each so found
for different reasons. 97 S.Ct. 2247 n.7.
The district court concluded that Brathwaite's claim of impropriety of the identifications
on appeal without first having objected to them at trial was sufficient to exhaust his state
remedies in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970), the habeas statute. The court
also alluded to the fact that it appeared that Brathwaite may have deliberately by-passed
state court procedures by failing to object to the identifications at trial, which would preclude
objection at the federal level. But the court then concluded that the burden was upon the
state to raise and prove the issue and the state's failure to do so precluded its consideration.
97 S.Ct. at 2247 n.7.
The court of appeals simply concluded that whether Brathwaite had exhausted state
remedies was not at issue since the requirement was "not jurisdictional but merely a
principle of comity, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963)." Brathwaite v. Manson, 527
F.2d 363, 371 (2d Cir. 1975).
The Supreme Court noted that since the lower federal courts had found the issue to
be properly before them, it was not inclined to rule otherwise. 97 S.Ct. at 2247 n.7. It
could have, however, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the matter
to the district court for reconsideration in light of Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497
(1977). The Supreme Court in Wainwright had held that absent a showing of actual pre-
judice and good cause for failing to make a timely objection in compliance with state law,
federal habeas corpus relief was precluded. Although Wainwright dealt with a Miranda
[Vol. 11:4
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been no deprivation of Brathwaite's due process rights as a result of the
identification testimony.' The court denied the petition, holding that al-
though the police used an impermissibly suggestive photographic identi-
fication procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification from Glover,
the procedure did not create a "substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification" as required by the 1972 Supreme Court decision of Neil v.
Biggers" in order to exclude the evidence. In conclusion, the district court
held that "[s]o long as the prosecution can demonstrate that the witness
had some opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the crime,
the witness can make an in-court identification and can testify concerning
the pre-trial identification regardless of the suggestiveness of the pre-trial
proceedings.""
Brathwaite appealed and the court of appeals reversed the lower
court. -1 2 In an opinion written by Judge Friendly, the court applied the
test set forth in the 1967 case of Stovall v. Denno"3 rather than the Neil test
used by the district court and held that the photographic identification
procedure employed by the police was impermissibly suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable misidentification and, therefore, both the testimony
with regard to the photographic identification and the in-court identification
should have been excluded.
The appeals court, however, disregarded the Neil decision and de-
termined that the rule set out by the Supreme Court in Neil applied only
to factual situations which occurred prior to the Stovall decision."4 The
crime in question occurred after the Stovall decision was handed down. Thus,
the importance of the appeals court decision was its conclusion that even
though a new test had been set forth by the Supreme Court in Neil, the
Stovall test still applied.
The state prosecution petitioned the Supreme Court and certiorari
violation, the Supreme Court could have applied the decision to the constitutional area at
issue irManson, or at least expressed a desire for the court of appeals to consider such an
expansion of Wainwright. It did neither.
9 Brathwaite v. Manson, No. H74-209 (D. Conn. May 13, 1975).
10409 U.S. 188 (1972).
11 Brathwaite v. Manson, No. H74-209 (D. Conn. May 13, 1975).
12 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975). For a discussion of federal court authority to review claims
not passed on by the state court due to failure of the accused to follow state procedural
rules, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2504 (1977) where the Court (citing to
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963)) concluded that a federal judge has limited dis-
cretion to deny relief only where there has been "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege." See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 687 n.7
(1975).
Is 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
14 For other jurisdictions which have adopted this interpretation, see note 43 infra.
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was granted. 5 After brief and oral argument, the Court held that the
criteria formulated in Neil should be applied when determining admissibility
of evidence obtained even during post-Stovall identification procedures and
that reliability factors set forth in Neil were to be weighed against suggest-
iveness of the identification procedures.1" The Court concluded that in
Brathwaite's case, the reliability factors outweighed the corrupting effect
of the suggestive photographic display and, therefore, there had been no
violation of due process. 1'7
In reaching its decision in Manson, the Supreme Court analyzed the
approaches it had taken in the past with regard to identification procedures.
While the Court had set forth a definite standard in Stovall, later cases using
the Stovall test were somewhat unclear. The Court, in Neil, produced a
different standard, but there remained some confusion as to whether the
Court meant to replace the Stovall test with that put forth in Neil.
The Stovall decision gave the first inclination that due process was a
necessary consideration in identification procedures. 8 In Stovall the Court
15 425 U.S. 957 (1976).
16 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977).
17 The Court applied the Neil factors to the facts of Manson and concluded that reliability
was not outweighed by the corrupting effect of the challenged identification. Id. at 2253-54.
In regard to reliability in Manson, the Court found that Glover had ample time and
sufficient light to view the heroin seller and that as a trained police officer on duty, his degree
of attention was much more scrupulous than that of a casual or passing observer. Glover's
description of the seller, which was given to local police within minutes after the sale, was
considered an accurate description of Brathwaite. His level of certainty was deemed high,
as demonstrated by his unequivocal testimony that there was no doubt in his mind that
Brathwaite had been the person who had sold him the heroin. Finally, the time between
the crime and confrontation was brief, as the photographic identification was made only
two days after the sale.
As to the suggestiveness of the procedure, the Court cited to Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968), where that Court had recognized that the danger that a witness
may err in identifying a criminal "will be increased if the police display to the witness only
the picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person he saw ..... After
considering Simmons, the Court, however, concluded here that there was "little pressure
on the witness to acquiesce in the suggestion that such a display entails. [The police] had
left the photograph at Glover's office and [were] not present when Glover viewed it two
days after the event .... And since Glover examined the photograph alone, there was little
coercive pressure to make an identification arising from the presence of another." 97 S.Ct.
at 2254.
After balancing the seemingly minimal corrupting effect of the identification procedure
against the numerous factors found to indicate reliability, the Court determined that the
reliability demonstrated was adequate to deny the respondent's claims of a due process
violation.
Is 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall was a companion case decided along with United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). In those two
cases, the Supreme Court recognized that a post-indictment pre-trial identification procedure
is a critical stage of the prosecution as recognized in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
which would entitle the accused to the aid of counsel. Absent counsel, the pre-trial identi-
fication testimony was inadmissible and the in-court identification was admissible only if
based upon observations of the suspect other than that pre-trial confrontation. This inde-
[Vol. 11:4
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held that if, while considering the totality of the circumstances, a pre-trial
identification procedure is found to be "unnecessarily suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable mistaken identification,"19 it violates due process. In
applying this standard, the Court required that a two stage procedure be
utilized. First, a determination had to be made as to whether the out-of-court
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. If it was found
unnecessarily suggestive, no testimony with regard to it was admissible at
trial and, in such a case, the second analysis was utilized. This analysis
concerned whether the suggestiveness was conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification. If it was, the in-court identification was also precluded. In
Stovall, the witness was critically injured and no one knew how long she
might live. The defendant was brought to her bedside where she identified
him as her assailant. The Court admitted that such practices of showing
suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification was usually
unacceptable but concluded that in view of the totality of the circumstances,
the police followed the only feasible procedure by taking Stovall to the
hospital room.2 1 In effect, the Court was saying that even though an identi-
fication procedure may be suggestive, if it is necessary in light of the totality
of the circumstances, it does not violate due process.
In three subsequent cases where the Supreme Court dealt with identi-
fication procedures, its conclusions were substantially consistent with those
of Stovall. In Simmons v. United States21 and Coleman v. Alabama,22 the
Court was confronted only with the issue as to whether an in-court identi-
fication procedure was correctly permitted by the trial court despite sug-
gestiveness employed in the out-of-court identification. The Simmons
Court cited to Stovall, holding that an in-court identification could be
made unless the pre-trial out-of-court identification was "so impermissibly
pendent basis, which was to be shown by the prosecution by clear and convincing evidence,
was determined by the use of factors similar to those used in Neil when considering due
process issues.
19 388 U.S. at 302.
20 Id.
21 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
22 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
23 In -Simmons, defendant was identified by witnesses, prior to trial, from photographs
shown to them by FBI agents. At trial, the prosecution declined to introduce the photo-
graphs on direct examination of the identifying witness. The defense, in turn, attempted
to obtain discovery of the photographs in order to cross-examine the witnesses with regard
to his pre-trial identification. However, the Court denied the request for discovery. There-
fore, no testimony was offered, nor was any testimony allowed, with regard to the out-of-
court photographic identification. 390 U.S. at 380-81.
In Coleman, the pre-trial identification was made at a station-house lineup which the
trial court concluded was unnecessarily suggestive. Although the court excluded the evidence
as to the lineup, it permitted an in-court identification. 399 U.S. at 4-5.
Spring, 1978]
5
Barbieri: Mason v. Brathwaite
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
AKRON LAW REVIEW
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification. ' -4 The Coleman Court, citing to Simmons, held likewise 5
The third case, Foster v. California," was decided after Simmons but
before Coleman. Foster, as did Stovall, dealt with both pre-trial and in-court
identification procedures.27 The opinion set out the Stovall language, but
did not discuss it further; the Court simply concluded that the pre-trial
identification procedure was "so arranged as to make the resulting identi-
fications virtually inevitable. 28 Inasmuch as the Court failed to apply per
se the two stage procedure formulated in Stovall, it became unclear whether
the Stovall procedure was the recognized test for constitutionality of identi-
fication procedures. Generally, however, lower courts when faced with the
issue of due process claims with regard to identification procedures, read
these four decisions as requiring a two stage analysis" which in fact was
later utilized by Judge Friendly in the Second Circuit's decision of Manson
v. Brathwaite.
Neil v. Biggers,"° decided in 1972, created confusion in the lower
courts as to exactly what test the Supreme Court had established. In Neil,
a habeas corpus proceeding, 1 the Court was faced with a factual situation
that arose prior to the Court's ruling in Stovall. The Court cited Simmons,
stating that "the primary evil to be avoided is the substantial likelihood of
24 390 U.S. at 384.
25 399 U.S. at 5.
26 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
27 In Foster, police used repeated pre-trial confrontations in order to elicit a positive identifi-
cation of the accused. The trial court found that the suggestive elements in the repeated
confrontations "so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate
due process." Id. at 443.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Johnson v. Wainwright, 523 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1975), where the circuit court af-
firmed the denial of habeas corpus relief by the district court. Petitioner had been identified
prior to trial by a photographic display found to be "unnecessarily suggestive" by the trial
court. The circuit court, in denying petitioner's appeal, cited to Stovall and Simmons and
held that "'impermissible suggestiveness' does not necessarily give rise to 'a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.' Such is the case when a witness' in-court
identification is based upon a source independent of the suggestive photographic display(s)."
Id. at 1255. The court concluded by citing to one of its earlier decisions, United States
v. Rodriguez, 510 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975), where it had set out the rule that "the existence
of an independent basis of in-court identification obviates the necessity of considering the
constitutionality of the pre-trial identification." 523 F.2d at 1255, quoting 510 F.2d at 3.
See also United States v Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Clark,
499 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
United States v. Cook, 464 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1972).
30 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
31 The case had already been before the Supreme Court on direct appeal, Biggers v.
Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968), but had been affirmed by an equally divided Court. Such a
ruling does not operate as a judgment on the merits and therefore, did not preclude the
defendant from petitioning for federal habeas corpus relief. See 409 U.S. at 190-92.
[Vol. 11:4
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irreparable misidentification"32 and then found that "[w]hile the phrase was
coined as a standard for determining whether an in-court identification
would be admissible in the wake of a suggestive out-of-court identification,
with the deletion of 'irreparable' it serves equally well as a standard for
the admission of testimony concerning the out-of-court identification itself."33
In so holding, the Court was deviating from the Stovall test by adopting
a Simmons approach to both in-court and out-of-court identifications. In
other words, the Court concluded that only one stage of the Stovall test, i.e.,
the "likelihood of misidentification" test,"4 had to be considered in deter-
mining whether the evidence should be excluded on due process grounds.
The Supreme Court in Neil said that the central question presented was
"whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification procedure
was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive."35
The Court also enumerated some of the factors that would indicate reliability:
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description
of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confronta-
tion. 6 In weighing these factors, the Court concluded that there had been
no violation of due process.
The Neil Court's major concern centered around the likelihood of a
misidentification of the defendant, rather than whether or not an unnecessarily
suggestive procedure was used. The fact that the procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive, by itself, did not violate due process. 7 Although the Court felt
that the police did not necessarily use the best identification procedures at
their disposal, the Court did not feel that the evidence should be excluded
on that basis alone. The district court in Neil had proposed an exclusionary
rule which would require exclusion of the evidence where a more reliable
procedure of identification had been available to the police and was not
utilized. The Supreme Court noted that an exclusionary rule as proposed
by the district court would have as its purpose deterrence and would not
be based upon a finding of a violation of due process. 9 The Court rejected
the proposal on the ground that the adoption of an exclusionary rule would
32 409 U.S. at 198.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 199.
38 Id. at 199-200.
37 Id. at 198.
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be unwarranted since the fact situation in Neil arose prior to Stovall and
Stovall was the first instance in which the Court indicated that due process
limitations were to be considered in identification procedures."0
Thus, when the question of the due process implications of the identi-
fication procedures utilized by the Connecticut police was first presented
to the Second Circuit in Manson, the court was faced with a dilemma of
how best to reconcile these somewhat inconsistent decisions of the Supreme
Court. Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, emphasized the
Supreme Court's language in Neil that the rule set forth in Stovall would
have no place in a case which preceded Stovall. Judge Friendly considered
this language to be a reflection of the Court's desire not to place an unfair
demand on the police, i.e., to apply the two stage Stovall test to a situation
which occurred prior to the formulation of the test, especially where that
test represented such a break with past law. 1 But since the Court was now
faced with a post-Stovall situation, Judge Friendly felt compelled to apply
the two stage Stovall analysis. He distinguished the Simmons-Coleman ap-
proach by pointing out that the Court in those cases was only faced with
the admissibility of an in-court identification which followed an un-
necessarily suggestive out-of-court identification not presented to the jury."2
The Supreme Court in Manson recognized that the lower courts had
developed two approaches to the admission of identification testimony after
the Neil decision. The first, the Stovall two stage test which was adopted
by the Second Circuit in Manson, was termed the "per se approach" 3 by
Judge Friendly, and was characterized as "focus[ing] on the procedures
employed and requir[ing] exclusion of the out-of-court identification evidence,
without regard to reliability, whenever it has been obtained through un-
necessarily suggestive confrontation procedures."" The second approach,
which is more lenient, relied on the totality of the circumstances and was
the approach set forth by the Neil Court. 1 This approach, the Court noted,
would allow identification evidence which possessed certain qualities of
401d
.
41 527 F.2d at 369.
42 Id. at 369-72.
4
-This approach had also been adopted expressly in Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 880-81
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub. nom., Wallace v. Smith, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973), and
seemingly in Rudd v. Florida, 477 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1973) and in Workman v.
Cardwell, 471 F.2d 909, 910 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974). See also
Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081, 1084-85, 1085 nn.5a, 6 (6th Cir. 1977).
' 97 S.Ct. at 2250-5 1.
,5 409 U.S. at 199. See also United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976); United
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reliability to be admitted despite any suggestive aspects which might have
arisen due to the manner in which the identification was obtained. "
It was at this stage in the development of a test for the constitutionality
of identification procedures that the Supreme Court granted the state's
petition for certiorari in the Manson case. The Supreme Court realized
the need for clarification, but before deciding which approach to adopt,
felt it must consider three distinct interests.
The first interest noted by the Court was the concern that only reliable
evidence be introduced to a jury. 7 The Court acknowledged that although
both approaches responded to this concern of reliability, the per se approach
of Stovall was considered to be too strict since, in the Court's view, it
automatically excluded identification testimony without the consideration
of alleviating factors.-"
This characterization of the per se approach would appear to be
misleading. The approach is only "automatic" in the sense that once a
finding is made that the identification procedure was unnecessarily sug-
gestive, an out-of-court identification must be excluded. Furthermore, to
declare that this finding is made "without regard to alleviating factors" is
clearly incorrect since alleviating factors are considered at both stages of
the two stage Stovall test. Once a court finds an identification procedure
suggestive in the first stage of the Stovall analysis, all relevant factors are
considered in the inquiry as to whether there was necessity for the procedures
employed. Alleviating factors are also considered in the second stage of
the inquiry, that is, when deciding whether or not the in-court identification
will be admitted. In this second inquiry, a court, in effect, will consider the
Neil factors to determine if the suggestiveness employed has irreparably
tainted the witness' testimony. Although the Supreme Court did not list
in Manson what it felt would be appropriate "alleviating factors," given the
Court's consideration of these circumstances in its earlier cases, it would
appear that the two stage analysis adequately confronts them.
As to the criticism that the per se rule "keeps evidence from the jury
that is reliable and relevant," it should be noted that the reason for the
inquiry into due process limitations of identification testimony is that such
evidence, by its very nature, is of questionable reliability. This problem is
compounded, as recognized in Neil, where suggestive identification pro-
cedures increase the possibility of misidentification. 9 Even in Manson the
46 97 S.Ct. at 2251.
47 Id. at 2252.
48 Id.
49 409 U.S. at 198.
Spring, 1978)
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Court recognized that the reliability of an identification procedure may be
diminished not only because the witness, who is usually under emotional
stress, is called upon to testify about an encounter with a total stranger,
but also because of actions taken by the police." Thus, the first stage of
the Stovall analysis, which would exclude evidence obtained through a
suggestive identification procedure, would serve to prevent the admission
of evidence which is of questionable "reliability."'" In addition, there arose
a question as to whether the evidence would even be relevant. Relevant
evidence is evidence which has probative value.52 If there is a question as
to the reliability of the evidence, it logically follows that there is a question
as to its probative value as well, and, consequently, a question as to its
relevance."
The second interest identified by the Court in determining which
approach to adopt was to deter the police from using prejudicial procedures
in obtaining identifications. The Court recognized that the per se approach
has a more significant deterrent effect on police behavior than the totality
approach but concluded that "the totality approach also has an influence
on police behavior." 5' The Court, apparently recognizing the frailty of this
stance, attempted to justify it by noting that the desire on the part of the
police to obtain convictions would result in the adoption of accurate identi-
fication procedures. It appears inconsistent that the Court would put forth
such a conclusion after the position it has taken in recent years on the
50 97 S.Ct. at 2252-53. This was the central concern of the Court in U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (where it found presence of counsel
at identification procedures necessary to protect against suggestiveness).
51 Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the Seventh Circuit, clearly recognized the point that
"[t]he primary purpose of such a [per se] rule would be to enhance the reliability of the
trial process in its search for truth .... This rule would be designed to minimize the
danger of convicting the innocent.... There is surprising unanimity among scholars in re-
garding such a rule as essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage of justice." United
States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 405 (7th Cir. 1975).
5 See Stauffer v. McCrory Stores Corp., 155 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Pa. 1957); People v.
Curtis, 232 Cal. App. 2d 859, 43 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1965).
53 Even if the evidence is found to be relevant despite consideration of the above proposition,
there arises a question as to whether its probative value is worth its cost. To answer
this question, probative value must be weighed against the probative dangers of prejudice,
confusion, time consumption and surprise; and if the probative value is found to be out-
weighed by the probative dangers, then the evidence may be ruled inadmissible. C. MCCOR-
MIcK, EVlDENCE § 185 (1972).
54 97 S.Ct. at 2252. It is interesting to note that the Court would accept an approach which
merely has an "influence" on police behavior while recognizing that the other available
approach, the per se approach, has a "more significant deterrent effect" when the police
activities have a direct bearing upon the degree of reliability of the witness' identification
which in turn may well be the foundation for the jury's verdict. Id. The dissent recognized
the majority's view as "totally ignor[ing] the lessons of Wade" where "the impetus for
Stovall and Wade was repeated miscarriages of justice resulting from juries' willingness to
credit inaccurate eyewitness testimony." id. at 2259.
55 Id. at 2252 n.12.
[Vol. 11:4
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exclusionary rule in regard to the fourth amendment. When required to
deal with the exclusionary rule, the Court has repeatedly expressed doubts
as to whether the police are deterred at all, i.e., whether the police officer
on the street, upon whose actions the exclusionary rule will most often
operate, really has any significant interest in obtaining convictions." If,
as the Court infers, there actually is any deterrent influence on the police
achieved by the operation of an exclusionary rule in the identification area,
when one appropriately considers the importance of the activities which
are being encouraged, i.e., the use of the most reliable means of identifica-
tion,"7 then adoption of the per se approach would seem the much wiser
choice by the Court. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in
Manson, "[the per se] rule would make it unquestionably clear to police
they must never use a suggestive procedure when a fairer alternative is
available. I have no doubt that [police] conduct would quickly conform
to the rule.""8
The Court's third and final concern was the "effect on the administra-
tion of justice" which the chosen approach would have." Here again the
Court's argument is not sound. The Court concluded that under the per se
approach, the trier of fact is being denied reliable evidence and this may
result "in the guilty going free." Aside from the serious question of whether
the jury is being denied reliable evidence, there is some difficulty with the
Court's assertion that this may result in the "guilty going free.""° If both
the out-of-court and the in-court identification testimony is admitted at
trial, and then it is found on appeal under the per se approach that the trial
court erred in admitting the out-of-court identification because the procedure
utilized was unnecessarily suggestive, reversal would be necessary unless the
appellate court found the error to be harmless. The "guilty," however, would
not go free since a retrial could be had and an in-court identification could be
made so long as there had not been any "substantial likelihood of irrepar-
able misidentification"'" engendered by the out-of-court identification pro-
cedure. Since this test would then be substantially the same test set forth
56 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court's doubts are perhaps justified
with regard to the fourth amendment considerations. At the conclusion of a study made
by the Washington-based Institute for Law and Research which showed that over fifty percent
of the 17,000 felony and serious misdemeanor arrests made by Washington, D.C. police in
1974 were so "flimsy" that the city law department refused to press charges, FBI Director
Clarence Kelley noted that the study showed "an obsession with the idea of measuring
crime fighting efficiency only by the number of arrests .... TIME, The Law, The Pinch Must
Really Sting, Sept. 26, 1977, at 59-60.
57See text accompanying note 51 supra.
58 97 S.Ct. at 2258.
59 Id. at 2252.
60ld.
6f Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
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in Manson, it is difficult to understand why the per se rule would not serve
the interest of preventing the guilty from going free as well as, if not better
than, the totality approach. In fact, since the per se rule allows the court
to scrutinize closely the identification procedure, that rule would seem to
insure that only the innocent person who had been subjected to an identi-
fication procedure fraught with grave risks of misidentification would go
free.62
The Court's concern with the trier of fact being denied reliable evidence
and the guilty thereby going free is remarkably similar to the sentiment
espoused by the Court in dealing with the exclusionary rule in the fourth
amendment search and seizure cases. 3 In utilizing this analysis, however,
the Court fails to recognize that interests being protected by the exclusionary
rules in the search and seizure and identification contexts are grossly dis-
similar. Under the fourth amendment the exclusionary rule often excludes
the most reliable, relevant and probative evidence of the individual's guilt
in order to protect his interest in being free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. This can result in a severe social cost, especially when there has
been a good faith mistake on the part of the police which results in evidenee
being excluded. Furthermore, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
is as yet unproven." But the exclusionary rule, when applied in situations
such as Manson, excludes not the most reliable, relevant and probative
evidence, but prevents the use of evidence gathered as a result of improper
police conduct or evidence where there is a substantial question as to its
reliability. The Court, therefore, seems to be mistaken in its belief that
it must limit the societal costs of allowing the "guilty to go free" because,
in fact, these costs may not be present in the context of the identification
procedure; or if they are, they are only present to a comparatively minimal
degree.
62 It is possible, however, that the Court was attempting to give consideration to the possible
strategic problem of the jury's diminished willingness to accept the in-court identification
testimony given by the witness as a basis for conviction, when a substantial period of time
has elapsed between the crime and the new trial occasioned by the reversal. This issue may
have been suggested by the Court in the facts in Manson as the first trial itself did not
take place until eight months after the crime and the delay between the out-of-court identifi-
cation and the trial may have possibly entered the Court's considerations of the desirability
of excluding out-of-court identification testimony. The only difficulty presented by this
strategic concern (if one accepts its premise) is that under the Court's decision in Manson,
the Court allows the jury to make a guilt determination based principally on the most
unreliable identification evidence.
63 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
4There have been no studies which have been accepted by the Court as proof that there
actually is any deterrent effect, and the once approved aim of judicial integrity, (see Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)) has been given minimal recognition by the Court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). Therefore, the balance of social costs versus
benefits to be gained is decidedly tipped against exclusion in the Court's mind at this time.
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The Court also failed to recognize, as noted earlier, that a finding that
the out-of-court identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive does
not necessarily preclude an in-court identification if the prosecution can
show an independent basis for the in-court identification. This lessens the
social costs of the per se approach. In contrast to exclusion of evidence in
the fourth amendment search and seizure cases, where a finding of a violation
of defendant's rights totally and forever precludes the use against defendant
of evidence obtained, here if the prosecution can show this independent
basis, some identification evidence may still be admitted. A conviction is
therefore not foreclosed and the social costs are significantly decreased.
The Manson Court, however, came to the conclusion that given these
three interests, insuring that the jury hear all reliable and relevant evidence,
deterring the police officer from using prejudicial procedures in obtaining
identifications, and minimizing the detrimental effects on the administration
of justice, the fairness required by due process was met by the Neil v.
Biggers rule. Thus, in the future, the governing inquiry will be whether or
not the corruption effect of the suggestive identification procedure is out-
weighed by the reliability factors set forth in Neil. If suggestiveness does
outweigh reliability, both the out-of-court and in-court identifications will
be excluded and the witness will be foreclosed from testifying altogether.
But if reliability outweighs suggestiveness, both of these identifications will
be admitted.
Considering the persuasive analysis of Justice Marshall's dissent and
Judge Friendly's opinion for the Second Circuit, however, some states may
feel a desire to depart from the majority's rule in Manson, and establish
under their state constitutions" a rule which requires that the most reliable
identification procedure must be utilized in their jurisdiction.
FRANK A. BARBIERI, JR.
65 See People v. Anderson, 44 Mich. App. 222, 205 N.W.2d 81 (1972) and State v. Opperman,
247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) in which Michigan and South Dakota declined to limit them-
selves to the Supreme Court's decision. See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HAuv. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977).
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